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The Justice of the Peace: Constitutional Questions
The highly controversial subject of the constitutionality of the fee
system presently employed in West Virginia to compensate the
justices of the peace has recently come to the foreground in response
to a statement made by Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark at the
annual meeting of the West Virginia State Bar in Clarksburg. In
reference to the need for judicial reform in West Virginia, Mr.
Justice Clark stated that "Article VIII... provides for the justice of
the peace as a constitutional office on a fee basis, even though
the system itself has been declared unconstitutional in criminal
cases..

"' The statement is susceptible of two interpretations-

either all fee systems, including the West Virginia system, are
unconstitutional, or fee systems are only unconstitutional when
they fall within the restricted sense of Tumey v. Ohio,2 West Virginia being in that category. The purpose of this note is to examine
the present statutory scheme of compensating justices of the peace
in quest of a determination whether it is unconstitutional, and
further to examine the rest of the justice system to determine
whether it contains other constitutionally objectionable features.
Obviously, the basis of the statement made by Mr. Justice Clark
is traceable to the case of Tumey v. Ohio.3 The holding in this case
is not exactly clear, and the Supreme Court has never given an
adequate interpretation of it. A review of the various state supreme
court cases applying it reveals considerable disagreement as to its
actual meaning.4
In the Tumey case, the defendant was arrested and charged
with a violation of the state liquor laws and brought to trial before
the mayor of a small community in Ohio. The defendant objected to
the hearing on the ground that the mayor lacked the required
qualifications, but was found guilty and fined one hundred dollars.
The mayor received a twelve dollar fee, payable only in the event
that the defendant was convicted. Careful scrutinization of the
case does not reveal any statement, express or implied, that a fee
system is unconstitutional per se. It seems evident that the Court
1 2 W. Va. State Bar News 334 (1966).

U.S. 510 (1926).
Ibid.
4 Vanlandingham, Pecuniary Interest of Justices of the Peace in Kentucky; The Aftermath of Tumey v. Ohio, 45 Ky. L. REv. 607 (1957).
2273
3
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intended to hold only that fee systems are unconstitutional when
they are of such a nature as to encourage partiality. Supporting
this viewpoint is the Court's statement that: "Every procedure
which would offer to the average man as a judge to forget to hold
the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which
might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between
the State and the accused, denies the latter of due process of law."5
Moreover, the case of Dugan v. Ohio6 lends further support to this
position. Dugan is factually similar to the Tumey case, except that
the mayor in this case was paid a salary from a common fund to
which all the mayors contributed. His salary, however, was not
dependent upon the conviction of defendants. The court in holding
the mayor was not disqualified from trying this case did not in
any measure distinguish it on a fee-salary basis,' which the court
surely would have done if the ultimate basis of Tumey had been
the unconstitutionality of a fee system per se. Instead, the court
simply said the Tumey case was controlling and sought to determine whether the mayor had any interest in the litigation.8
Consequently, it seems most probable that the proper interpretation of Mr. Justice Clark's statement is that he used the term
"fee system" in the restricted sense of the Tumey case. This was
obviously the interpretation put upon the decision by the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in 1935 when it ruled the
prior fee system unconstitutional." The legislature thereafter enacted the present justice of the peace statute in an effort to retain
a fee system but to avoid the infirmities that existed in the prior fee
56 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524 (1926).
Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1927).
7
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1926).
89 Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 64-5 (1927).
Williams v. Brannen 116 W. Va. 1, 178 S.E. 67 (1935). The fee
system as it existed prior to the Williams decision created a fund for each
justice into which was paid the fine collected from each conviction. The justice was permitted to pocket the court costs, but was required to pay to
the sheriff the fine collected. The sheriff in turn credited the amount of
the fine to the justice's personal fund. In instances when the defendant was
found not guilty, the justice submitted a bill to the sheriff, and the sheriff paid the bill out of the funds accumulated in fines from past convictions. If no funds were accumulated, the justice was not paid. Thus it was
necessary for the justice to convict an appreciable number of defendants to
assure his salary in non-conviction cases.
Following the Williams decision, the legislature amended the fee system
(7-5-15) to enable the justices to draw upon the general county fund in
cases where the justices fund was insufficient to meet the justice's bills
as they were submitted. It would seem that if it could be shown that some
of the general county funds become dissipated every so often, that this would
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systems." ° No case in West Virginia appears to have ever tested

the constitutionality of the present fee system. Thus, its constitutionality is still open to question. On the surface the statutory
scheme of compensation appears to meet the requirements of

Tumey, but a thorough examination of the act and the procedures
involved reveal the existence of possible constitutional objections.
Economic Competition Among Justices

The first plausible constitutional objection to the present arrangement is that it encourages economic competition among the
justices. An understanding of the operation of the present fee
system is necessary to understand exactly what this economic

competition is and why it might possibly engender conduct proscribed in the Tumey case.
The basis for the justice of the peace system is rooted in the
West Virginia Constitution which provides that each county
is to be laid out into districts, not less than three nor more
than ten in number;" there is to be elected from each district
one justice of the peace, and if the population of any district exceeds twelve hundred, then two justices of the peace are to be
elected therein."2 The constitution does not, however, set forth

any specific method of compensation but merely grants the
legislature power to prescribe the proper procedure. 3 The legislature, since the first adoption of this provision, has compensated
negative the effect of the 1935 amendment to the fee system. According
to Mr. Richard Shelton, Executive Director of the West Virginia Ass'n of
County Officials, this past year, as in preceding years, several general county
funds throughout the state did go dry. Does this mean that the present fee
system employed in West Virginia is unconstitutional on this ground?
To be sure, the answer is not as simple as it appears. There is a strong
argument tat, admitting the fact that sever al e
l county funds are
completely dissipated each year, this does not of itself void the present fee
system. This is because the code provides (7-5-7) that when there are insufficient
funds his
to meet
the obligations
the will
county
is authorof
notethethesheriff
indebtedness
on the bill of
which
ized
to endorse
signature
Since, at
interest.
legal
bear
will
such
as
to the holder and
county
the
funds haveit
wherein
county
those
present,
instruments
negotiable
they the
aregeneral
as though
billscounties
cash inthe
gone drythewillbankcs
would appear that this eliminates any interest the justice of the eace could
be said to have in seeing that sufficient funds are always avail-able in the
general school fund for payment in spite of the lack of funds in the general
county funds.
lo W. VA. CODE ch. 7, art. 5,§6 (Michie 1966).
ine,
27
. w. VA. GoNs. ar.
12

Ibid.

p3rW. VA. CONST. art. X,

§ 6.
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the justices of the peace on a fee basis. There seem to be two
basic underlying thoughts behind the adoption and retention of
the fee system by the legislature. First, it wanted a compensatory
system that was monetarily self-sustaining. This is evidenced by the
constant reenactment of the general school fund plan or "justice
fine" fund as it has been called. 4 Second, it seems obvious that
past legislatures have felt that the compensation of the justices
should be directly related to the amount of work each performs.
In other words, incentive was to be the measure of compensation
for the justices.
With this understanding of the constitutional provisions and
legislative thought in the background, attention may be turned
to an examination of the current legislative fee system employed
in criminal cases. The compensation of the justice in criminal
cases is determined solely by the number of cases he hears. Likewise, the determination of the number of cases the justice hears
rests largely in the discretion of the law enforcement officers in a
county. Under the present statutory scheme there is no specific
method prescribed for a law enforcement officer's allocation or
distribution of cases among the justices of his county. An officer
may bring any arrested person or direct any person to whom he
gives a traffic ticket to any justice of the peace in the county
where the arrest is made or the ticket is tendered. Considering
the fact that an officer can take his cases before any of the
justices in his county, it seems highly improbable that the justice
of the peace can "hold the balance nice, clear, and true between
the State and the accused"'" in those cases where the officers are
the principal witnesses against the accused. Since the justices of
the peace are dependent upon the very same officers who are
testifying against the accused to provide them with future cases
from which they earn a fee, it cannot be assumed that the justices
of the peace are entirely free to view the testimony of the arresting
officers critically and accept the testimony of the accused. Nor
is it likely in those instances where an officer may have acted
14A partial history of the constant reenactment of the fee system is
found in Davis, Elldns, & Kidd, The Justice of the Peace in West Virginia 15
(Bureau for Government Research W. Va. Univ. Pub. No. 23 1958). The
fines of each justice are paid into a fund, which at the end of each year
is paid, if any remain after the justices are paid their fees, into the General
Revenue fund of the state for the support of the free school system.
' Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524 (1926).
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hastily or exceeded his authority that the justice will be overly eager
to reprimand him. 6
When the arresting officer happens to be a constable, the
danger that the justice of the peace will fail to "hold the balance
nice, clear, and true between the State and the accused" is at its
height. The constable's compensation, like the justice's, it determined on a fee basis." The compensation of the constables stems
from basically two sources, arrests and services rendered at the
request of a justice of the peace."8 Thus, by the nature of the statutory scheme, the justices of the peace and the constables are greatly
interdependent upon each other to earn their fees. The justice
of the peace depends upon the constable to bring the cases before
him, and the constable depends on the justice of the peace to
assign him to deliver summons and subpoenas and perform other
services. It is somewhat natural for a justice of the peace and a
constable to pair off and operate as a team. In such instances,
there is a real temptation for the two to combine efforts in an
attempt to "drum up a little business." Where this kind of relationship exists, it is unlikely that the justice of the peace will ever question his "partner's" testimony or basis for arrest. It is in this type
of arrangement that there is a distinct possibility that a justice may
attempt to conceal the fact that a constable is making arrests
wihout a valid basis, and, in reasonably close cases, he may not
"hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the State and the
accused." 9
In civil cases, the justices of the peace must rely on the individual
plaintiffs to supply them with enough cases to make the job
economically worthwhile.20 In order to insure that the job is
economically worthwhile there is a strong temptation to favor the
several good "customers" of the county who institute suits in the
justice of the peace courts with some regularity. The best "customers" the justice of the peace can have are the local stores and the
small loan companies." If a justice is fortunate enough to have
such a "customer," there is bound to exist an air of favortism toward
16For several illustrative cases of this justice-law enforcement officer
see Luvera, Justice for a Fee, 53 A.B.A.J. 242 (1967).
relationship
' 7 W. VA. CODE ch. 50, art. 17, § 1 (Michie 1966).
18 Ibid.
19 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524 (1926).
0
2 W. VA. CoDE ch. 50 art. 17, § 1, (Michie 1966).
21 Silverstein, Small Claims Courts versus Justices of the Peace, 58 W. Va.
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him. The reason is that a justice is well aware of the fact that
such a plaintiff can change his patronage to one of the other
justices in the area, which may range from 2 to 19 depending on
the county.22 Thus, considering the fact that these good "customers"
bring many suits before the same justice, and that the Code provides
that the losing party pays the fees of the justice and the constable, it is hardly surprising that "the justice is likely to favor such
a plantiff."2 3 As Mr. Lee L. Silverstein stated in his article on
small claims courts, "The fee system makes a justice's income
depend in part on which way he decides. No wonder people say
j.p. means judgment for plaintiff!"
In as much as the justice's income is in part dependent upon the
way he decides certain cases, it would seem a defendant might have
a valid due process objection to the justice hearing the case. Such
an objection was raised in two recent cases."
In a Michigan case26 the defendant, charged with a parking violation, was brought before a justice of the peace. After objecting to
the qualification of the justice on the ground that the fee system
created a climate of unfairness and a temptation to favor the complaint or plaintiff, the defendant demanded a trial by jury and was
found guilty of the violation. On appeal, the court stated that the
"fee system does not create... a pecuniary interest so that in every
case the defendant would be deprived of a fair and impartial trial."27
The court held that since the defendant had had the benefit of a
trial by jury, the jury being the judge of fact and law in Michigan,
the defendant was not deprived of the fair trial guaranteed him
by the state and federal constitution. In a concurring opinion, however, it was stated that the fact that the defendant had demanded
a jury trial rendered moot the serious question presented by the
case.2" Thus, because of the factual situation, the Michigan court
was percluded from deciding the federal question involved. The
language of the court, however, seems to indicate that the defendant
had raised a valid constitutional objection.
L. REv. 241, 243 (1956).
22 W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 27.
23 Silverstein, op. cit.
supra note 21.
24
Ibid.
2

sPeople v. Cheever, 370 Mich. 165, 121 N.W.2d 430 (1963); In re
Borchurt, 57 Wash. 2d 719, 359 P.2d 789 (1961).
6People v. Cheever, supranote 25.
27
id. at 166, 121 N.W.2d at 431 (emphasis added.)
28
Id.
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In a Washington case,2 9 a defendant, convicted by a justice of
the peace for operating a vehicle without an operator's license and
while under the influence of alcohol, instituted a habeas corpus
proceeding. The defendant contended that since the number of
cases submitted to a justice determined his income, and the
number of cases could be controlled by the cooperation of law
enforcement officers, the justices had sufficient interest in the outcome of the case to come within the scope of Tumey v. Ohio."
The superior court held that the fee statute providing compensation
for the justices was violative of the fourteenth amendment, but
the state supreme court reversed the decision in a 5-4 vote. The
supreme court in reversing the case did not squarely meet the objection raised by the defendant, but instead rested the decision
upon the fact that the defendant had refused an offer for a change
in venue to a salaried justice at no cost.3 ' The court did note certain procedural distinctions between the rights of the defendant in
this case and the defendant in the Tumey"2 case, but it does not
affirmatively appear that the court's majority rested the decision
on these distinctions at all.
The four dissenting judges33 did not accept the waiver argument
the majority advanced nor the procedural distinctions, and, concurring in the defendant's contention, stated:
We have here not a disqualification by direct pecuniary
interest, but a disqualification by prejudice arising from
indirect pecuniary interest. Due process is denied in both
29

1n re Borchert, 57 Wash. 2d 719, 359 P.2d 789 (1961), criticized in
36 WAsn.
L. REv. 519 (1967).
30
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1926).
31 If the objection raised in the instant case were to be raised in West
Virginia, it appears that the majority opinion here would offer little, if any,
basis for meeting the same objection in West Virginia, since West Virginia
does not have a venue changing statute, nor salaried justices and it would
affirmatively appear that the West Virginia court, in the Williams case, has
already rejected the procedural distinctions the Washington Court set out.
32 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1926).
33 In re Borchert, 57 Wash. 2d 719, 806, 359 P.2d 789 (1961). The right
to be tried before a court which is above reproach on grounds of bias or personal
interest is so fundamental to the ideals of Anglo-American law and any pertinent definition of justice, that I cannot in good conscience subscribe to the
waiver argument of the opinion. In fact, I would classify absence of personal
bias and personal interest as sine qua non of the judicial administration of
justice. I cannot compromise these and my good conscience to say that
respondent waived this fundamental right and was foreclosed from collarterally attacking his conviction.
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instances because the tribubal is not impartial. .. .The
income of the justice of the peace depends directly upon
the volume of cases filed. If no cases are filed he receives
nothing. Vice inheres in the system. 4
Moreover, the dissenters stated that "the very real likelihood" of
bias has been demonstrated by the published studies of the law's
scholars. The dissenting opinion contained the following excerpts
from these writings:
The fee system, although the amout of fees be not
dependent in terms of the result, tends to impair judicial
integrity. Police and prosecutors can punish a justice
of the peace who discharges defendants whom they wish
to convict, by failing to bring cases before him," 5
The primary evil resulting from the fee system is the
pressure it exerts on each justice who operates under it to
get more business in order to enlarge his income...
Most criminal complaints are made by officers exercising
police powers. These officers naturally seek convictions,
and would be expected to patronize justices who aid them
in their efforts rather than those who insist too ridgly
upon protecting the rights of the defendants. A sympathetic attitude toward the views of the police is therefore
quite likely to result in more business and an increase in
the justice's income ....It is very common in all states
where the justices compete for business, to find instances
where the sheriffs office, or the state police, or any other
agency engaged in enforcing the criminal law, take most or
all of their cases to certain justices notwithstanding the
fact that other justices may be more conveniently accessible. In such cases it is not difficult to conclude that
the favored justice renders service acceptable to the
officers who bring in the business. 6
The dissenters concluded by stating:
We are confronted, then with a system in which the
income of the unsalaried justice of the peace is uttery
3

4
5

1d. at 735-36,

359 P.2d at 798-99.

at 737-40, 359 P.2d 799-80, Citing LuMAS, THE TB4IL JUDGE.
36 id. at 737, 359 P.2d 799, citing Sunderland, A Study of the Justice

3 1d.

of the Place and Other Minor Courts. Conn. B. J. 300.
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(sic) dependent upon the whim and caprice of the arresting officers ... .The test is whether this enticement inheres
in the system. It does. On the one side, the justice of
the peace is tempted to enhance his income by doing the
bidding of the arresting officers; on the other, he must
decide impartially in each case. No more is required to
show a very real likelihood of bias. It is the constitutional
right of every person . . . to be tried by justice of the
peace as impartial as the law can devise."'
Therefore it can be stated that strong arguments exist to the
effect that the present fee system employed in West Virginia
is unconstitutional in criminal cases because it engenders a "procedure that offers to the average man as a judge to forget the
burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which
might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true
between the state and the accused."38 Moreover, it may certainly
be argued that the civil jurisdiction of the justice is unconstitutional
because the system lends itself to the temptation of the justice
to favor regular plaintiffs in order to direct business his way.
The Question of Judicial Competence
Why do I speak of the quality of the justice dispensed
in the justice courts as "often woefully poor?" In the first
place, because the justice of the peace is ignorant of the
law he administers, and if he holds a jury trial, the jury is
not only also ignorant of the law, but is without the means
of being adequately instructed in it since it is the judge of
both law and facts and must try and decide both from the
conflicting assertions, denials, and the sophistries of the
two litigants or their counsel. A jury in even the justice
court may conceivably be trusted to determine facts correctly for they are usually somewhat simple; but law is

37 Id.
38

at 737, 359 P.2d at 799.
Id. at 741, 743, 359 P.2d at 801-3. The concept that a justice must be
knowledgeable in the law is not a new concept, but rather one deeply rooted
in our jurisprudence. In the Magna Charta, section XLV, we find the statement, "we will not make any justiciaries, constables, sheriffs, or bailiffs, but
from those who understand the law of the realm are well disposed to
observe it."
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never so simple that it cannot be warped and twisted
beyond all recognition in the hands of a clever exponent. 9
West Virginia is no exception to this statement of complaint against
the justice of the peace, and, although there is scant authority on
the matter, it may well be that this infirmity offers a second basis
for constitutionally objecting to cases being heard by a justice of
the peace.
In 1958 the Bureau for Government Research of West Virginia University conducted an extensive study of the justice of
the peace system in West Virginia.4" One aspect of the study was
a questionnaire survey designed to determine the general nature
and competency of the justices of the peace in this state. The
Bureau sent out questionnaires to some three hundred and eighty
justices of the peace in the state, and, while only one hundred
and forty-four responses were received, the results of the survey
indicated that our justices of the peace are almost entirely without
any schooling or learning in the law." Of those justices responding,
only one had had any schooling in law, and approximately one-half
of the justices had failed to obtain a high school education.42
This condition is a product of history. From the inception of
the office in the fourteenth century4 until the turn of this century,
the number of persons trained in law has not been sufficient to
adequately fill the justices' offices. Thus, there was thrust upon
laymen the duty of filling them. Since they were "ignorant of the
law", their determinations had to be predicated upon what is
commonly called "common sense". The question to be considered
here is whether such a determination satisfies the due process
requirement guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.

39

Zimmerman, Courts-Justices of the Peace Courts-Recommendation,

21 ORE.
L. REv. 381 (1942).
4
oDavis, Ellins, & Kidd, The Justice of the Peace in West Virginia
(BuREAu FOR GOVERNMENT RIESu_
41 Id.
42

cHI, W. VA. UNwv. PuB. No. 23 1958).

at 9.

Id.For a general
of the peace throughout
justice of the Peace, 12
41 1 Edw. III, c. 16

discussion of the lack of legal training of the justices
the country see Vanlandingham, The Decline of the
KAN. L. REv. 389, 391, 392 (1964).
(1326-7).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol69/iss3/8

10

Partain: The Justice of the Peace: Constitutional Questions

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

The difficulty in defining the phrase "due process of law" has
been repeatedly recognized." It has been said that the term "due
process of law" asserts a fundamental principle of justice, rather
than a specific rule of law, and thus is not susceptible of more than
a general statement of its intent and meaning, which are ascertained
in the history of its specific application to cases requiring judicial
decision." Therefore, it is necessary to look to the case law to see
if there are cases to be found that will shed light on the question
considered here.
An examination of the case law reveals that it has generally
been held that an erroneous decision of a court on matters within
its jurisdiction does not deprive the unsuccessful party of his rights
under the due process guaranty where the parties were fully heard
in the regular course of judicial proceedings.4 It has been
intimated, however, that if the error is gross and obvious, coming
close to the boundary of arbitrary action, there may be a violation
of the guaranty.4" Dicta may be found in several other Supreme
Court cases to the effect that when a judgment amounts to mere
arbitrary or capricious exercise of power or is in clear conflict with
those fundamental principles which have been established in our
system of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of
private rights, then, it does violate the due process guaranty. 8
The upshot of these cases, it would seem, is that, while the due
process clause does not guarantee a judgment will be entered in
accordance with the law, it does guarantee that the judgment will
be rendered pursuant to law.49 Moreover, it would seem that if
this be true, then the necessary effect of this is that the due process
guaranty requires one to be familiar with the law to be a
judge, since a person could only render judgments pursuant to
law when he is sufficiently knowledgeable in the law to apply it.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that one may constitution44State v. Sponaugle, 45 W. Va. 415, 32 S.E. 283 (1898); Louisville
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1927).
4- Territory v. Craig Enterprises, Inc., 355 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1957).
46 Roller v. Murray, 71 W. Va. 161, 765, 772 (1912); writ of error dismissed 234 U.S. 738 (1913).
4z Roberts v. New York, 295 U.S. 264 (1934).
48American Ry. Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 273 U.S. 269 (1926); Corrigan
v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1925); West Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904).
49 The writer uses the phrase "pursuant to law" as the opposite of an
arbitrary or capricious decision.
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ally object to any justice of the peace trying a case when it can be
shown that the justice is not conversant with the law. For it only
stands to reason that, since the justices are not trained in law,
their decisions may be arbitrary, and, if arbitrary, then necessarily
fall within the scope of the injudicial conduct condemned by the
Supreme Court as violative of basic due process.
Examination of the law reveals no case where the question of
whether a justice must be learned in law was judicially considered
and determined. Several cases hold that "one is not required to be
a lawyer to be eligible for a judgeship,"." but these cases are not
directly in point. The objection raised here is confined to the
simple assertion that it is a fundamental principle of due process
of law that a justice, having the power to deprive a person of his
liberty or property, must have a working knowledge of the law
since the guarantee of due process of law requires that every man
must have his day in court and benefit of general law; and it is
questionable whether a judgment based on "common sense" would
comply with this demand.
The existing conditions apparently have arisen because it has
been forgotten or overlooked that the justice of the peace court
is just as much a court of law as any other court of law in this
state.5 ' Being a court of law, it must render judgments pursuant to
law and not pursuant to "common sense." The fact is, and must
never be forgotten, "no lawsuit is small; for justice is never a small
thing. The smallest matter may be of supreme moment in the life
of the individual affected." 2
The fact that a defendant may be entitled to a trial, de novo,
at the circuit court level, where the judges are judically competent,
does not diminish the strength of the constitutional objection, because in many instances a defendant would ordinarily incur less
cost by paying a moderate fine or judgment than by paying appeal
costs.5 " And in those instances where a person is erroneously inso See cases cited n. 36, 48 C.J.S. Judges § 15 (1947).
51 Note, 52 VA. L. REv. 151, 168 (1966).
52 Keebler, Our Justice of the Peace Courts-A Problem in Justice, 9
Tmr.5 3 L. REv. 1, 5 (1930).
E.g. in Monongalia County the minimum recommended legal fee for
trial of a J. P. appeal is $75.00. Monongalia County Bar Ass'n Schedule of
Minimum Fees (1965).
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carcerated, the defendant may well choose to serve a short sentence
to avoid the costs incident to an appeal, or serve the sentence completely unaware of the fact that his rights were violated or
abused. The simple fact is, as the West Virginia Court stated in
Williams v. Brannen," "The Constitution requires that the accused
shall be tried before a fair and impartial tribunal in the first
instance where he will not face the alternative of paying an unjust
fine or resorting to the delay, annoyance and expense of an
appeal.""5
It may be noted at this point that the full impact of "common
sense" determinations becomes even more manifest when considered
in light of the foregoing discussion of the economic involvement
of the justices in litigation in their courts. Determinations based on
.common sense" leave too much room for arbitrary, capricious,
and, in many instances, biased decisions. Therefore, it appears that
.common sense" determinations by justices of the peace do not
satisfy due process guaranties of the constitution.
CONCLUSION
The writer has suggested two possible constitutional objections
to a justice of the peace trying a case. Whether the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals will sustain the objections is a question
that only time will answer. If the objections are sustained, the
legislature will be called upon to make wholesale reforms in the
present system. Any such reform by the legislature should not be
undertaken without reference to the very fine discussions on reform
of the justice system found in Mr. Lee Silverstein's article56 and
the report prepared by the Bureau of Government Research.
George Lawson Partain

54

Williams v. Brannen, 116 W. Va. 1, 5, 177 S.E. 67, 69 (1935).
55 116 W. Va. 1, 177 S.E. 67 (1935).
56 Silverstein, Small Claims Courts Versus Justices of the Peace, 58 W.
L. REv.
241 (1956).
7
Davis, op. cit. supra note 40.
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